Introduction
Walter Chatton (ca. 1290-1343/4), is best remembered today, when he is remembered at all, as an English Franciscan theologian whose forceful criticism of certain aspects of William of Ockham's (ca. 1285-1347) philosophical views forced the latter to re-think his earlier position. 3 Although there is no evidence that this was the case with respect to Ockham's political views, this does not mean Chatton's contribution to the poverty controversy is without interest. In fact, although it is sometimes complained that Chatton was a better critic than constructive system-builder, we cannot say this of his defense of Franciscan poverty. His attempt to reconcile the recent pronouncements of an increasingly critical Pope John XXII from the early 1320s shows a good deal of novelty, both in terms of how he repositions the axioms of the debate and in the conclusions he draws from them. Chatton evidently thought the question of Franciscan poverty was an important one, for he wrote about it three times following the publication of Ad conditorem canonum (first version dates from 8 December 1322; second from about a month later). 4 We have a reportatio of the sixteenth question of the third book of his Sentences commentary; the treatise De paupertate evangelica; and what is probably a re-elaboration in quaestio form (itself likely a reportatio). The three texts are closely related, but distinct. Decima Douie edited the treatise and the quaestio together even though they are different enough that she could not collate the two texts. Instead she marked in the texts and in the notes where there was significant agreement or disagreement between the two. This means one has an edition of the treatise that is 'confirmed' where possible by the subsequent quaestio.
The following considerations allow us some precision in terms of the relevant dating of the different texts. It is thought that Chatton delivered his Reportatio on the Sentences between 1321 and 1323. 5 Since the Reportatio quotes directly from and refers to arguments that are only found in the redacted version of Ad conditorem, 6 yet makes no mention of Cum inter nonnullos (12 November 1323), he must have lectured on the third book of the Sentences in the spring of 1323 at the earliest, but probably not much later than November of the same year. The re-elaboration of the question in the Reportatio in the form of the treatise likewise probably came before the contents of Cum inter became known in England. 7 Although we cannot be certain that the treatise was written before he knew the second bull, the fact that the quaestio does contain a reference to Cum inter does suggest that only the quaestio was written after November 1323. 8 Since, finally, none of the texts contain a reference to Quia quorundam mentes (10 November 1324), the quaestio itself must have terminus ante quem of about November 1324.
In addition to the tight time frame in which the different texts were composed, they likewise betray a very close correspondence in terms of content. 9 Thus, Wey and Etzkorn, eds., Chatton: Reportatio, 4:xii, date the lectures of Reportatio III-IV to 1323-24, but the omission of any mention of Cum inter, would suggest a delivery before or early in 1324. Cf although I think it was wrong to conflate a text which cited Cum inter with another that did not, because the three texts articulate a common and consistent point of view, we can provide a synchronic account of Chatton's thoughts about Franciscan poverty, at least from this period of his life.
10 Before turning to Chatton, however, a brief word needs to be said about the state of the order around the time he wrote his texts in the 1320s.
The Franciscan Order during the Reign of John XXII
As is well-known, the mendicant poverty controversy reached a fevered pitch during the reign of Pope John XXII (r. 1316-1334).
11 In some ways it has often been seen as a continental affair. A good example of this is perhaps Ockham's own account of how he finally became involved in the dispute. The document in question dates to 1334, that is, well after Ockham had fled Avignon under pain of excommunication because he was terrified by the prospect that the world's spiritual leader had become a heretic. Some caution, then, is merited when we read in his highly polemical Epistola ad fratres minores that, You know, and all Christians know, that I sat around in Avignon for nearly four whole years before I came to realize that the one presiding there had incurred heretical depravity. For, not desiring to believe easily that a person established in so important an office would stipulate that heresies must be held, I cared neither to read nor to hold his heretical constitutions. 12 As is well known, thanks to Michael of Cesena's initial urging, Ockham did become a trenchant and vociferous opponent of Pope John XXII and his successors. If, however, we can accept that Ockham was initially unwilling to find out how 10 Since he spent his last ten years or so in Avignon, it is generally assumed that at the very least he stopped defending his earlier views on Franciscan poverty vocally. See There are, nonetheless, points of commonality with the Franciscan tradition. It is in this sense that we can discern some of the common intuitions fourteenthcentury Franciscans had regarding property rights. But Chatton was neither a Michaelist avant la lettre, nor any sort of 'Spiritual Franciscan' concerned more with the quality of use than the absence of proprietary lordship, nor did he, finally, merely wish to bend to Pope John XXII's interpretation of Franciscan poverty. Bend he did in the end, but not without serious reservations. 20 In these earlier writings, he tried to reconcile a 'plain' understanding of dominium in a larger framework of the manifold (and usually specialist) meanings of dominium with the pope's own pronouncements. In so doing, Chatton provided a sophist- icated account by medieval standards of the powers associated with proprietary lordship. When it came to evangelical poverty and property, the Franciscan tradition was rich indeed, and not reducible to one or two basic positions.
Chatton on Ius
As the debates of the fourteenth century tended to turn on the various meanings an author assigned to the terms ius, dominium, and usus, I shall analyze Chatton's views in the same way. However, we should note at the outset that Chatton makes much of the fact that '[he] does not intend here to use the terminology of canon or civil law', but rather 'to use the manner of speaking according to the understanding that men commonly have in the Church, who are not trained in the terminology of this or that law (ius), whether they are simple people, or are more or less instructed in sacred scripture'. 21 As we shall see, it proved impossible to wholly avoid legal language and concepts, but, to take Ockham as a point of comparison once again, it is true that his interpretation of many key terms owes little to the ius commune. On the one hand, Chatton can be read as taking a sly jab at the lawyers in the perennial dispute about the relative superiority of the faculties of law and theology. 22 To be sure, we would probably look in vain for a medieval theologian or a lawyer who ranked his own scientia second in importance, but aside from any rhetorical purpose such a focus might be thought to have-including, for instance, cutting short any overly juridical definitions of use or lordship-there are relatively obvious philosophical reasons for keeping in view such 'non-technical' definitions. Chatton, like most philosophers, defended the view that knowledge had a role to play in evaluating the moral status of one's actions: 24 If you ask whether he can wish to give to anyone what is his own without a practical syllogism, I say that it is so. If [you ask] whether you might hold that, in acting laudably, the manner of acting (processum) is 'right' without a practical syllogism, I say that it is not so. . . . In order to act in a praiseworthy manner, love and knowledge of the end is required beforehand. 25 A practical syllogism, as Chatton explained elsewhere, is 'directive of our actions'; 26 but it is formed from abstract thoughts (ex cognitionibus abstractivis).
27
The point in all this is simply that one needs to know what one is doing in order to merit praise or blame for one's voluntary actions. Since adherence to and violations of a religious vow is a deeply ethical issue, Chatton insisted that giving up lordship was not merely an example of privation, which was commonly understood as being unable to contribute to perfection: it was rather a positive act of the will. 28 There is thus good reason to insist on limiting the meanings of example of a diversitas locutionis in his political writings can be seen with respect to the potentia dei controversy; see Opus nonaginta dierum (= OND) 95. dominium to those that a religious would have implicitly understood when he made the vow. Technical, legal meanings of dominium were quite simply not part of the vocabulary of a 'simple cleric or layman' who has entered religion and experienced it for a year before making his vow. Such a person does not only not know the laws (iura), he does not even care about how it (ius) might be explicated. 29 In fact, the order's General Constitutions repeatedly show just how simple and uncomplicated a friar's vow of poverty was.
30
This attitude explains the scanty attention paid to the meaning(s) of ius in Chatton's texts, and the equally low profile of lex as well. Yet the two terms do not disappear from sight altogether. At one point, in his discussion about whether it can be proven by natural reason that people are bound to love God above all else, Chatton seems to off-handedly equate lex naturae, lex naturalis, and ius naturale, which he inaccurately quoted from the Decretum.
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Chatton evidently believed in the inviolability of ius naturale, for when he came to refuting Nicholas Trevet, a Dominican active in Oxford around the same time as Chatton, 32 he implicitly agreed with this aspect of the argument. (His concern was the nature of dominium, to which we shall return.) Trevet had apparently claimed that 'lordship in common' belonged to a person by ius naturale. 33 In the De paupertate, Chatton's issue was not with the lordship itself but with the imprecise way the phrase 'in communi' was being used; was it, he wondered, the whole world or merely a special 'college' such as a convent; and, in fact, why wouldn't this argument apply to an individual just as well as a community? 34 Elsewhere, Chatton showed just as little concern for ius in a more recognizably 'subjective' form, namely in the passages in which he treated of the so-called right of using. Although the De paupertate subjects Ad conditorem canonum to a fairly close reading, Chatton did not care much to discuss what is meant by ius utendi, perhaps because he thought it smacked too much of the courtroom. Chatton quoted from the bull where it is argued that neither use nor the right of using can be had for consumables since ownership perpetually without use must be considered useless. 35 The Reportatio does not answer this objection by explaining what a ius utendi is. Chatton merely responded that this argument would militate against the personal poverty of all religious, 'which is not conceded', and that such an argument does not seem to pertain only to consumables. 36 Both of these are Michaelist/Franciscan commonplaces: wherever possible, they tried to point out that the pope's arguments about consumables-were they true-would render all members of religious orders individual property-holders. 37 The De paupertate offers a longer answer to this point, but it casts the question of rights of using consumables in the context of whether 'the lord Pope reserved to the Roman Church the dominium of one egg, one curd of cheese, one crust of bread, or other such things of which the brothers have the use'. 38 There are two different places where Chatton seems to have assimilated the ius utendi to being a type of dominium or at least potestas. The first arises in reference to the pope's claim that any use without a right of using must be unjust.
39 Chatton half-agreed: the argument is good for a 'licit power of using', but why does it work for the power of claiming in court, conserving beyond necessity, or exchanging 40 -that is, the three characteristics which, for Chatton, make up one important meaning of dominium.
The second passage is the longest discussion by Chatton about ius utendi. It comes in his response to John's point that any just use requires a right of using. 41 Unlike other defences of Franciscan poverty, Chatton did not reject the argument outright. His response is therefore a little surprising. First, he explained that the pope's argument does not work for the ius utendi that the brothers have abdicated in their vow. So far, Chatton has kept to a common Franciscan point of view. But he then added that it also has nothing to do with the ius that the pope has (if he should reserve such a ius utendi on the consent of the friars). Rather, it is an argument about the ius utendi that refers to the power of licitly consuming a thing. Otherwise, he continued, the argument would prove that Christ (and indeed other religious) had exclusive human dominium-which is a conclusion he took to be patently absurd. 42 (246): 'Quantum enim ad usum facti absque omni iure utendi simplicem attinet, nulla rerum ad fratres differencia est censenda. Sic enim uti de facto possunt prohibitis et permissis. Quare premissa rerum distinccio ad illum usum facti pocius est referenda, pro quo ipsis competit fratribus ius utendi. ' The italicized portions (or their equivalent) can be found in De paupertate, p. 225. 42 De paupertate, p. 225: 'Ista deductio non est contra praedictam, sicut patet ad V argumentum et ad VII, quia non currit de iure utendi, sumendo ius utendi quomodo fratres ius utendi abdicant in voto suo; nec etiam quomodo dominus Papa ius habet, si tale ius utendi ex assensu fratrum sibi reservet, quale superius est descriptum. Sed procedit sumendo ius is really being spoken about is proprietas and dominium, which is there being taken for the power of licitly consuming a thing.
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It thus seems clear that Chatton mostly avoided worrying about ius, and when he did, he connected it to dominium. That is, when the friars said they had vowed to live without any ius utendi, they meant that they had abdicated any sort of proprietary mastery over the things they used. By their vow, friars gave up any personally-determined power to licitly consume a thing. Obviously, friars did use and consume things; what Chatton meant was that authorization to use had to come from someone else, not the friar himself. This is analogous to the situation of the apostles. Christ had neither ius nor dominium, and he did not wish the apostles to have any either, even in common. All he permitted them-and established by law-was the accepting of the things necessary for life, and that they not be concerned about any such thing, nor contend in court for it.
44
Chatton on Dominium Since our focus is on the theory of property rights itself, and not on what kind of property rights Christ did or did not have, I shall refrain from worrying about the question of dominium in the early Church except insofar as it sheds light on the theory of property itself. But with this comes one caveat: it is assumed throughout that any 'historical' state of affairs that Chatton describes about features of property rights from earlier periods are just as possible now as they were then, unless he explicitly says that that is not the case.
Chatton started the De paupertate by distinguishing between two major types of dominium, divine and human, with the express goal of showing that Christ practiced the highest poverty while in possession of divine lordship, but without the human variety. Dominium might be considered divine or human either in terms of its source or in terms of who possesses it. Chatton, unfortunately, never made it clear in which sense he meant the distinction, although it is clear that he was only interested in the varieties humans might possess, regardless of their source. 45 In fact, having made this basic distinction, Chatton thereafter ignored 'divine' lordship and presented a complex picture of human lordship. The one characteristic that all forms of human lordship seem to share is that, whatever the type, human dominium is renounceable. In an interesting twist, Chatton explained the passage from Genesis, 'exercise lordship over the fish of the sea' (1:28) in terms of its final cause. 46 On this, he differed substantially from the emerging and contemporary Michaelist perspective. 47 According to Chatton, the passage should be understood to mean we were born to exercise lordship over these creations, 'not that anyone is actually (actu) a lord of some part of the world, but only that everyone has been born to exercise lordship'. Lest that sound exactly like natural lordship, he added: 'So each and every religious, apostle, and even Christ, had been born fit to have human dominium; but each one did not have it: this was because each one freely wished to lack all lordship on account of God. were, we are not obligated to exercise this faculty. If one wonders how one could live without any (human) lordship, Chatton suggested three ways: by labouring, by begging, or through the free gift of alms. 49 Lordship itself can be considered superfluous since one can get by on use alone.
50
As
p1. to lack lordship and use of superfluous things;
p2. to lack lordship of things one still must use to stay alive; and p3. to lack superfluous use of things necessary to stay alive.
51
In other words, Chatton thought a Franciscan desired to lack all but the nonsuperfluous use of necessary things. He came about as close as a friar could get to defending the Olivian notion of usus pauper as one could get without making it an explicit feature of the vow of poverty. Two other points are apparent. First, the two categories of things one must consider are 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' for the prolongation of human life. 52 Second, lordship must be completely abdicated, while use cannot be. 49 d3. the power (when necessary) of defending them in court. These three powers do not exhaust the range of things dominium might refer to. For example, the dominium the Church has reserved to itself of the goods the friars use consists of two different powers: 55 cd1. the power of claiming things for the uses of the friars; and cd2. the power of taking things away from the friars whenever it pleases. Clearly, besides the obvious conceptual overlap between d1 and cd2 on the one hand and d3 and cd1 on the other, it is also apparent that friar who lacks d1-3 would be at the mercy of the person who is in possession of cd1-2.
There is a third 'modern' power Chatton felt compelled to mention. People sometimes say a lord of thing has: 56 iudicialiter, nec potestatem eas conservandi ultra necessitatem, quae tres conditiones sunt conditiones dominii, sicut communiter sumitur. ' d'2. a power of using a thing without consumption. And, finally, a 'sole lord' is sometimes said to be, d'3. he to whom a thing is owed in such a way that no other person has a power of licitly using that thing. Chatton thus provided an intricate way of thinking about proprietary lordship (none of these powers would seem applicable to political lordship). What is perhaps most significant in this system is that these different ways of thinking about what dominium might mean are not mutually exclusive, although perhaps we should conclude that the lordship which the Church has reserved for itself seems to be a special subset of powers that does not apply in normal circumstances. Since Franciscan poverty is a unique form of poverty, this may not be overly surprising.
We can complicate the picture some given the close identification of dominium with potestas. Chatton admitted that Christ could have a 'human power of licitly ordaining, converting, distributing, and exchanging with respect to things necessary to them' and yet not have the three powers that Franciscans have renounced by vow (d1-3) . 57 The use of the words 'converting' and 'exchanging' seem clearly at odds with D1, but it is clear that he talking about administrative powers: that is, Christ qua prelate. These also seem to be powers that a dominus solus would have, or powers he could endow someone else with. Thus we should include them in Chatton's picture of proprietary lordship (collectively: da). In a way, this would seem to be a useful genus for the two powers that make up the Church's lordship over Franciscan goods, especially the second power (cd1-2).
With some rearranging, the picture of proprietary lordship for Chatton seems to look like Figure 1 . Although it is clear that Chatton never combined everything into one overarching picture, we have not contradicted his theory if we describe the holder of dominium solum as being able to do d1-3 and d'1-2. That is, the lord of a thing, who can exclude others from using it, must himself be able to use it (which may entail consuming it), save it for later, or, Chatton was not interested in how these different powers can be rolled up into one, preferring instead to look at them individually, or in smaller groups in order to show how the Franciscans, individually and collectively, have voluntarily given most of these powers up. A point to note is that Chatton wrote that the presence of one power does not necessarily imply the presence of absence of another.
58 This is not too different from modern accounts of ownership, which tend to speak of bundles of rights and duties while denying that ownership should be thought of as no more than a particular bundle of these rights and duties. 59 It is no less important to note that the different meanings of dominium are always explained in terms of power (potestas). While Chatton is hesitant to talk about dominium and proprietas as (merely) the power to licitly consume a thing-for that would be to take the words in an unaccustomed way, more appropriate to a usuarius than dominus-he accepted that it could be stretched to such a use. 60 We shall discuss the power to use in the next section, but for now, we need to consider the other three powers (d1-3).
Let us start with the power to conserve a thing for future use (d1). Chatton was well aware of the standard terminology, for he used the very phrases of the General Constitutions: 'present or imminent future necessity'. 61 That is, he accepted that Franciscans must on occasion conserve hard to find items for the near future, and that this can be done without thereby acquiring property rights. The operative assumption was perhaps that present or future use by the friars would be the intention of the donor, who may nonetheless revoke the power to use at any moment.
What, then, is involved in the vow to lack lordship? What is being given up? According to Chatton, giving up lordship is not an example of privation of something (which was commonly understood as not being able to contribute to perfection), it is rather a positive act of the will.
62 This is, for instance, what the Franciscans have done by depriving themselves of the power to take action in court. This instead was left to the Church (cd1). It was one power covered by the 'reservation of lordship', as Chatton called it. And unlike the rather negative way litigation was described by the Michaelists, Chatton saw it in a positive light. 'To litigate', he said, 'so that all injury is removed and justice observed, seems to be of perfection; in fact, it is of imperfection to omit this with respect to the one for whom this is licit. And by one's legal action, one can reduce 59 See, e.g., Tony Honoré, 'Ownership', Making Law Bind (Oxford, 1987) errors to right conduct'. 63 In his elaboration of why this position makes sense, he conceded a small, but significant point. It is worth quoting in full:
I say for this reason that, on this point-that the Roman Curia would justly claim for the uses of the brothers, when it is necessary, things granted to them for necessary use-it suffices that the brothers themselves have a licence of using those things according to the will of the donor, for then those things would be owed to them for use in such a way that others could not take those things away from them (as far as use is concerned) without sin. But from this it does not follow that the brothers have any lordship over those things (just as 'lordship' includes the above-said conditions), nor that the brothers themselves may claim these things in court; not that the use of those necessary things is owed to the brothers in such a way that a claim cannot be just, but that the brothers have deprived themselves of the power of claiming things in court, just as is clear regarding Christ and the apostles. 64 Chatton here denied the Franciscans dominium in some senses of the word, admitting only a licence of using, yet things are apparently owed to the friars in a way that results in it being wrong for others to interfere with the friars' use of the things in question, and that the Church can take legal action to recover them. One might wonder, as John XXII surely did, why this did not qualify as a 'right to use'. Chatton had claimed the use of ius utendi by the pope was more or less shorthand for dominium or proprietas, but there appears to be some inconsistency here. One solution, perhaps, would be to put the emphasis on the word necessary; it is, after all, always assumed by Chatton that we are talking about necessary, and not superfluous, use.
The last point is clearest where Chatton answers the objection that dominium could not be considered superfluous 'because, if the community cannot claim things or take possession of them in court, the use of everyone [in the community] would depend completely on the free will [of others], and, consequently, when anyone can freely withdraw his favour at a moment's notice', the members of the community would expose themselves to peril, and could end up killing themselves through starvation. 65 Among his responses to this objection, one was particularly germane in a post-Ad conditorem canonum world. According to Chatton, the lordship of the community was not needed for this since, if things needed for use are taken away undeservedly, although the friars cannot seek them in court, they can go to a prince or powerful man and beg for their help so that the necessary things are returned.
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Chatton's last line of defence for Franciscan poverty was that it was not strictly necessary that anyone have lordship of the goods the friars used. Chatton's account of corporate poverty is fairly straightforward, and anticipates the Michaelist position to a degree. 67 For Chatton, a community is nothing more complicated than taking all the people of the community together. Thus, if all those people have 'one total lordship', and each person therefore has 'individual partial lordship', then if one lacks all individual partial lordship, he also lacks all lordship in common. 68 Thus, a community can lack lordship just as easily as a person can. 69 Chatton also made use of another argument that would become popular with Ockham, which was to point out that if all members of a 65 De paupertate, p. 50: 'Si dicatur, quod dominium communitatis non superfluit sed requiritur mediato, quia nisi communitas posset res iudicialiter vindicare et occupare, usus cuiuslibet illorum dependeret simpliciter ex libera voluntate et, per consequens, cum quilibet alius poterit libere suum beneficium subtrahere ad tempus, aliqua occasione accepta, quilibet illorum de illa communitate exponeret se ipsum discrimini et posset esse homicida sui, si moreretur fame. ' 66 De paupertate, p. 52: '5º quia dominium communitatis non requiritur ad hoc, quod rehabeantur ablata indebite necessaria ad usum, quia si res necessariae concessae ad usum sunt ablatae, convenit eas repetere non iudicialiter sed mendicando, et contingit ire ad principem et divites, et mendicare ab eis auxilium eorum, ut tales res reddantur. Aeque enim contingit mendicare ab aliquo potente auxilium in casu necessario, sicut ab eo convenit mendicare victualia. ' Cf. Reportatio 3.16.1.17 (4:144). 67 Tabarroni, Paupertas Christi, p. 95, noted the similarity to Ockham, but he was defending an earlier argument of Francis of Marchia; see Robinson, Ockham's Early Theory, pp. 275-81. 68 De paupertate, p. 49: '2 m assumptum patet ex articulo 2, nam habere dominium in communi est habere partiale dominium proprium, quia habere dominium in communi est communitatem habere dominium. Sed communitas non est nisi illae personae simul sumptae. Ergo hoc est illas personas simul habere unum totale dominium illius rei; et hoc est quamlibet personam esse partialem dominum et, per consequens, quaelibet persona habet dominium proprium partiale. Et sic si careat omni dominio partiali sibi proprio, careat omni dominio in communi. ' Cf. De paupertate, p. 44; Reportatio 3.16.1.13 and 85 (4:143 and 161). 69 De paupertate, p. 48. community but one were to die out, whatever property rights that community had before would not magically devolve to the sole remaining individual. 70 The purpose of Chatton's account of how corporations work was to be able to show that a papal retentio dominii, although done for pious reasons, was unnecessary. 71 To help bring this point home, Chatton explained that when the Church had reserved to itself the lordship of the things granted to the brothers, one could understand this in three ways; however, the only correct way of understanding this reservation was in terms of the power of obtaining (or taking away) the things the friars use as it pleases (i.e., cd2). 72 In this way, it was in fact entirely possible for the friars to lack lordship in the three key ways (d1-3) and the Church to lack its form of lordship (cd1-2). 73 It was possible, for example, for people to live by means of mendicancy (per viam mendicationis).
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On the one hand, Chatton's account is plausible in that he has carefully distinguished the different ways he believes the term dominium has been used. Yet, if neither the Church nor the friars have dominium of what the friars use, one might be inclined to think the things in question are res nullius and thereby available to the first person to take possession of them. Chatton was surely aware of the concept, though his terminology does not match that of the libri legales.
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Chatton's response depended on his position regarding corporate lordship. If everyone in the world were to die besides one good Franciscan-or one of the apostles, or Christ-the state he could observe would not be effected: although no one else would have human lordship, neither would the sole survivor.
76
The implicit assumption was most likely that Chatton thought that one cannot hold property without the will to do so, which would rule out children and madmen, as well as people who have vowed to live without property. 77 This was a common belief, 78 and it would mesh well with his belief that a vow of poverty, or the desire to be poor, precluded the possibility of acquiring property, 79 and with his point that wishing to lack lordship is a positive act of the will. 80 In fact, a vow of not having lordship and its observance does not require that another have the lordship. 
Chatton on usus
Chatton spoke about dominium in terms of potestas; since he spoke about usus in the same terms, it remains to examine where and why use and lordship differ, if at all. As the earlier diagram tries to show, dominium-if that is what a dominus solus should be said to have-often includes various powers of using as part of its feature set. Yet Chatton took it as self-evident that lordship and use had to be separable because otherwise 'every religious in the world would have direct (immediatum), total lordship of the thing that he consumes, and thus lordship individually'.
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Where Chatton and the pope seemed to agree was on the point that the friars cannot be considered to be 'only users' (tantum usuarii). The 'kind' of dominium Chatton meant in this case was that of taking dominium for the power of licitly consuming a thing. This passage also deserves to be quoted in full:
This deduction seems to proceed with respect to lordship and ownership not [taken] according to the customary understanding, according to which those religious vow to lack lordship, but by taking lordship for a power of licitly consuming a thing; for, by taking lordship in this way, and proportionally taking usage (usuarium) in this way-by distinguishing it from having a power of licitly consuming such a thing-the deduction holds up well. For they are not such users only: rather, they have a power of licitly consuming a thing [d'1] according to the will of the donor. Yet, with this it stands that they are users in this way: that they neither have the power of converting things [d1] to any use they wish against the will of the donor, nor the power of claiming those things in court [d3], nor the power of conserving them beyond present and imminent future necessity [d2]. And therefore, by taking lordship for the lordship that includes that triple power [d1-3] with respect to those things which are consumed by use, they thus have no lordship, but are only users (distinguishing usage from having such lordship The reason the 'users' in this quotation have a power of consuming rather than a more generic power of using is explained by the fact that Chatton was writing in the context of using consumables. We know, however, that he thought the basic mechanics of using consumables and non-consumables were the same.
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The key to all of this are the terms potestas and licite. Chatton agreed with the pope that one cannot 'give' an act of using to another. In the case of one person letting another ride his horse, Chatton repeated that the donor gives neither the horse, nor the act of riding; rather, he grants that the other person 'can exercise his act of riding'. That is, he grants him a ius utendi.
85 Chatton, we know, mostly avoided speaking in terms of the right of using; he also avoided speaking about use of fact, though there is some slight evidence that he thought usus facti and usus simplex were interchangeable. 86 For him, the issue was whether one was acting (or obligated to act) according to the will of the donor. What the donor must give them is the potestas, that is, the authority to use the thing licitly: 'If, therefore, lordship is taken for the potestas of consuming a thing licite, and the one conferring [it] reserves to himself that lordship, by meaning lordship in this way, they cannot then consume the thing licite'. 87 In other words, the dominus must give the power: it is not innate, and there is no mention in this case of the licence of using (licentia utendi), which the Michaelists would rely on so heavily.
licite consumendi rem secundum voluntatem dantis. Cum isto tamen stat, quod sic sunt usuarii, quod nec habeant potestatem convertendi res in quoslibet usus contra voluntatem dantis, nec potestatem licite vindicandi res illas iudicialiter, nec potestatem conservandi eas ultra necessitatem praesentem et imminentem. Et ideo, sumendo dominium pro dominio includente istam triplicem potestatem respectu istarum rerum quae usu consumuntur, sic nullum dominium habent sed sunt usuarii tantum, distinguendo usuarium contra habentem tale dominium. ' 84 Thus, whereas John XXII spoke about the right of using, and the Michaelists about the licence of using, Chatton framed his answer in terms of a power of using; in the Reportatio, he once wrote about a 'licit power of using' (de licita potestate utendi), which is perhaps closer to the Michaelist positions. 88 Yet, Chatton was also content to admit that this power of using was the same as the pope's meaning of ius utendi, although he did insist that this use of 'right of using' was not the one used when friars abdicated a ius utendi in their vow.
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(This may seem somewhat surprising since the Rule never once mentions a right of using; nor, in fact, do any of the General Constitutions.)
All this talk of a power of using licitly should make another thing clear: the use must, quite literally, be allowed in some way. 90 In the first place, only the use of necessary things was allowed. All superfluous use is out, which includes everything beyond what is presently necessary or necessary in the imminent future. For Chatton, that included food, clothing, the divine office, and sapiential study. 91 The other important criterion was that the use was done according to the wishes of the donor. This seems to be the main point of the power of converting (d1). Lacking the power to convert things to other uses against the wishes of the donor carefully circumscribes the 'power' the friars have. Franciscans might have a power to use non-superfluous things necessary for life, study, and spiritual duties, but that is all they had. Moreover, the friars could neither use goods against the wishes of the donor, nor without the sanction of the Church. Although there is not a hint of the controversial usus pauper terminology, Chatton envisaged an austere modus vivendi, albeit one replete with a qualified form of potestas.
Conclusion
One conspicuous difference between Chatton and most other contemporary defenders of Franciscan poverty is the almost complete absence of ius naturale. One might be inclined to see this as a development stemming from the Scotist account of the development of private property. Like Chatton, John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), writing in the first decade of the fourteenth century, also seemed to disregard the juristic propensity to distinguish between lex and ius, and to elaborate a theory of the origins of dominium based entirely on human positive law. 92 Yet, while other authors tended to discuss ius and the case of extreme necessity, Scotus included, 93 Chatton did not. Property for Chatton was a feature of regular positive law, and his account of it gave ample scope for Franciscan non-ownership without recourse to suprahuman systems of law (ius), either positive or non-positive. Yet although the friars managed to do without direct ownership, and although what they used was meant to be limited to the austere category of the non-superfluous use of necessities, Chatton set high standards for the respect of property rights. Medieval authors tended to treat property rights as largely immune from outside interference, 94 but Franciscan non-ownership turned the question from a bilateral concern with an onwer / non-owner dynamic into a three-party arrangement composed of an owner, a user, and an outside party. According to Chatton, the obligations of non-interference by the outside party are owed to the owner, not the user; and it is all tied to the belief that the owner's will about how his or her goods may be used must be respected. Respect for the owner's wishes also explains the limited potestas a friar has when he uses a thing he does not own. Had Chatton wanted to, he could have pointed to the Franciscan Rule, which stated that the friars were to eat from whatever was set before them, as an example of living according to the wishes of another. 95 That is, the friars, like traditional monks, do not get to decide for themselves how and what they are supposed to do with the things given to them. 96 Although it is unsurprising that a friar (or a monk) should not act according to his own will from the perspective of the goal of religious life, it is hard to reconcile with medieval moral philosophy or indeed with the history of the poverty controversy. 97 Regarding the poverty controversy, the so-called Spirituals time and again took it upon themselves to judge whether the order (and its leadership especially) was operating according to the Rule and true intentions, as they understood them, of their founder. Official bulls, including the recent Exivi de paradiso (1313) and Quorundam exigit (1317) were unable to convince the disaffected that obedience to their superiors would be enough to ensure they were fulfilling their vow of poverty. 98 The philosophical problem is no less significant. As noted above, Chatton placed important cognitive demands on the determination of right conduct. And yet, his explanation of Franciscan poverty explained that a friar exercises no judgment of if, how, or when he may use the things he does not own. In such a scenario, it is not clear how his actions could be considered meritorious. (Incidentally, a similar problem existed for the Michaelist solution based on the licence to use, and yet none of the Michaelists, Ockham included, addressed the conflicting requirements of the lack of individually-determined ability to use based on externally granted licences, the vowed(!) duties to obey one's religious superiors, and the cognitive requirements for ethically correct action.)
Chatton's account is unlikely to have found support from all corners of his order, however. The biggest hurdle is where he wrote that friars may beg the pope or a secular lord extra-judicially so that the goods the friars use-or are supposed to use-might be restored to them. This kind of arrangement may well make sense for an international religious order tens of thousands strong, but it probably gave the friars too much control to appeal to friars inclined to more austere forms of evangelical poverty. To a critic like Ubertino da Casale, for instance, appealing to the pope for the restoration of goods might smack too much of wearing gloves in order to avoid handing money directly.
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The most remarkable feature of Chatton's interpretation of Franciscan poverty is the avoidance of any significant discussion of 'rights' in the senses we have come to expect from the texts of this period. In discussing the forever contested ius utendi, however, Chatton concluded that an owner is granting a power to use, and the point is that a person who receives this potestas has received legitimate authority to use the thing. In admitting that this could be what the pope meant by the term 'right of using', it may seem that Chatton was willing to admit Franciscans have a right to the things they use; but it should be clear that Chatton did not think this was a 'right' in the relevant sense because Franciscans do not have any control over how a thing is to be used, or even if it can be used should the owner decide otherwise. What mattered most to Chatton's conception of poverty was that friars gained only the authority to use in accordance with the owner's wishes. It is a carefully circumscribed power, and it underscores that for a medieval author even the language of power need not imply that a person is operating in the realm of unfettered power relations disentangled from the bonds of morality or the demands of society.
Other aspects of ownership as described by Chatton do suggest that his list of the 'incidents of ownership' (to use Honoré's terminology) include an 99 E.g., his comment in the text known as Rotulus iste in relation to the passage in the Rule (4. autonomous sphere of choice, as one would expect. The decision to describe all these incidents in the language of potestas brings everything into sharper focus. Although these are powers no Franciscan (qua Franciscan) possesses, they seem to be powers that belong to the realm of free choice insofar as they are described by Chatton as powers to convert or conserve property according to one's wishes. This differs in some respects from the more duty-bound role earlier scholastic authors envisioned for property in both the Franciscan and Dominican camps.
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Be that as it may, it should be clear by now that Chatton's contribution to the question of Franciscan poverty, while undoubtedly a Franciscan contribution, was distinctly his own, and it helps us see how broad the 'Franciscan' spectrum was when it came to property and poverty. It is often remarked that for an order of friars who wished to do without (positive law-based) rights, they spent a lot of time worrying about rights of all sorts. Chatton is evidence that a sophisticated theory of poverty need not be based on such language. 
